Whether Investment Notes Are(n’t) Securities Is Kinda Important To A Jury Verdict For Securities Fraud

Apprarently, the question about whether something is or is not a security has become a hot issue, judging by two consecutive blog entries.

Link:  U.S. v. McKye

I noticed a case that primarily involves procedural issues for trial, a subject to which I have not paid much attention since law school.  However, the substance of the appeal involved securities fraud and whether or not the instruments in question were securities.

McKye was convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering.  As it turns out the McKey case provides an interesting take for transactional lawyers on how this issue may come up at trial.

Background

McKye prepared revocable trusts for clients and financed the costs with loans for those who could not pay.  Promissory notes represented the loans, and in some cases, there would be a lien on the client’s house.  He also sold “investment notes” that offered a guaranteed annual return of 6.5% to 19.275%.  There was some documentation showing a pledge of collateral supporting the investment notes, which turned out to be from the persons who financed the costs of the revocable trust services.

McKye and his salesmen told people that the instruments were backed by real estate notes and mortgages and that they were not securities.

McKye received about $5.9 million in proceeds from the sales of investment notes, which he used to pay other investors (you may know this structure as a “Ponzi scheme”) and to pay his own expenses.

At trial, McKye requested a jury instruction to determine whether the investment notes were securities.  The court said that the notes are presumed to be securities and that McKye failed to present evidence overcoming that presumption.  A jury instruction indicated that the notes were securities.

The Upshot

After a discussion about the analysis of whether a note is a security, the appeals court determined that the question of whether a note is a security is a mixed qustion of fact and law.  Mixed questions of fact and law must be submitted to a jury if they implicate an element of the offense.  In this case, securities fraud requires . . . the offer or sale of any security . . .”  Because the government was required to prove that the investment notes were securities as an element of its case, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the notes are securities.

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For those interested, here are some excerpts regarding the ‘note as security’ analysis, discussing the U.S. Supreme Court case of Reves v. Ernst & Young, the primary case in this area:
“Although 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) defines a security to include “any note,” the Supreme Court held in Reves that “the phrase ‘any note’ should not be interpreted to mean literally ‘any note,’ but must be understood against the backdrop of what Congress was attempting to accomplish in enacting the Securities Acts.””

 

“The Court then identified a list of notes falling “without the ‘security’ category,” to include (1) a note delivered in consumer financing, (2) a note secured by a mortgage on a home, (3) a short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, (4) a note evidencing a character loan to a bank customer, (5) a short-term note secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, (6) a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business and (7) notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current operations.”

 

“The Court further explained that any note bearing a “family resemblance” to the enumerated notes also does not fall within the Act’s definition of a security. Id. at 65-67. It adopted a four-part test to determine whether a note meets the family resemblance test. Id. at 66-67. The four factors are: (1) “the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it,” (2) “the ‘plan of distribution’ of the instrument,” (3) the “reasonable expectations of the investing public,” and (4) “whether some factors such as the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.

 

 

When A Sale Of Real Estate Is(n’t) A Sale Of Securities

Searching for a legal argument port in a storm, the plaintiffs are left stranded as a condo sale is deemed not to be a security.

Link:  Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel

We have seen the issue come up with investments as citrus groves, payphones (remember those?), country club memberships, timeshares, viatical settlements and fractional ownership in airplanes.

When is something other than a share of stock or a bond a security?

Well, the 9th Circuit just told us in Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel when a condo/hotel room is not a security.

Background

The Hard Rock Hotel San Diego is a twelve-story, mixed use development with commercial space and 420 condo units.  The public was offered the opportunity to buy condos through what would be considered general solicitation in the securities world.  They could use the condos for 28 days per year.  The purchasers later signed a management agreement for the units months later, which was apparently required by the purchase agreement.

Something must have gone wrong, although it is not stated in the opinion.  The plaintiff-purchasers sued the hotel operator, developer, landowner, manager and real estate broker for various securities fraud related complaints.  They claimed that the sale of the condos and the later management agreements combined to form a security, the sale of which violated various parts of federal and California securities law.

The Upshot

The court decided that there was no security involved.  The court will find a security if there is money invested in a common enterprise with profits anticipated by virtue of others’ work, but there was no such arrangement here.  This is what we in the biz refer to as the Howey test*.

Contrasting a prior case** where condos were considered securities, the court stated that the plaintiffs allege no facts showing that:

  • purchase agreements and management agreements were offered as a package;
  • the management agreement was promoted at the time of sale; or
  • that the management agreement would result in investment profits.

In addition, it was stated in court documents that the agreements were executed eight to fifteen months apart.  The court had a difficult time accepting that signing two agreements months apart with separate entities had the economic reality of a single transaction or that the only viable use of the condos was as investment property, as opposed to short-term vacation homes.

As a result, there was no sale of security and, thus, no claims for relief under federal or state securities law.

*Based on SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)
**Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989)